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Introduction 
 
During a negotiation, some people ask for more than others, 
and obtain more than others. They do not necessarily have different 
rights, different bargaining power, or different skills or endowments, 
but they feel that they deserve a greater outcome than others do. They 
have a different perception of themselves in the negotiation process, 
i.e, a different mental model. Thus, they have different expectations of 
the negotiation, and get a different outcome. And economic theory has 
a hard time in assessing the role of this on economic outcome. This 
paper explores the relevance of this idea in the case of a policy 
negotiation in Costa Rica, and tries to assess the role of mental model 
in the negotiation outcomes.  
In Costa Rica, bean and dairy sectors had to face liberalization 
in 1994 and have taken part to policy negotiations to try and get 
support from government to compensate for lower prices. Before 1994, 
both sectors were protected from international markets by a system of 
high import tariffs. Since that, the dairy sector managed to negotiate 
a quasi unchanged domestic market protection, while bean sector lost 
its protection with a drastic reduction of import tariffs. That induced 
an increase in bean imports from more competitive exporting countries 
and a decrease in domestic production and many farm went 
bankrupted. We develop below the argument that this comes partly 
from their attitude in the negotiation process, and discuss the 
hypothesis that the bean sector representatives have adopted a “low 
profile” and defensive attitude because they do not see themselves as 
allowed to claim much from the members of government, and the milk 
sector representative have adopted a more offensive and proactive 
attitude because they see themselves as allowed to claim for a large 
support from the government.  Of course, negotiations in these two 
sectors differ not only by their negotiators attitude, and this is why 
this article allocate a great effort in distinguishing the very 
contribution of mental model to the outcome in the bunch of 
altyernative sources of explanation.  
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The intuition that “habits of thoughts” or “beliefs” could 
influence behaviours is not new, but attempts to measure their exact 
role in economic behaviours are recent and remain somehow 
theoretical. North coined the term “mental models” to designate 
representations through which individuals interpret their environment 
and their relation with this environment, giving rise to a blooming 
literature on the role of agents’ mental models in their economic 
choices when the latter are not fully understandable through the 
reading of their economic interest only.  
Among the many fields where mental models potentially 
influence decision making, the participation of organizations to policy 
negotiations is particularly appropriate to our purpose. Indeed, a 
policy negotiation gathers organizations with different backgrounds in 
front of a same problem that is basically obtaining as much support 
from the government as possible. Thus, differences in behaviours 
reflect what organizations have to gain objectively from this 
negotiation but also by who they are, what they believe they can gain 
(see Grindle 2001). In this paper, we analyze the specific context of 
trade liberalization in agriculture. Changes brought by liberalization 
are exogenous to each sector, and the extent to which the government 
has to compensate for this change is a matter of pure negotiation, 
without any legal pre-existing framework. The way farmers consider 
this change as unavoidable or not is critical in the negotiation outcome, 
and has little to do with the actual welfare loss or even the actual 
political weight of the farming sector. Mental models prevailing in 
policy negotiations are “collective” in the sense that leaders’ mental 
models are supposed to be representative of the organization, even 
though those leaders are probably chosen for their specificities, 
including their perception and reactivity to institutional changes.  
To test the hypothesis that mental models influence strategic 
behaviours, we first give an objective characterisation of each 
negotiator’s mental model.  To do so, we propose them a same 
interview and analyse their speeches through a textual statistical 
analysis. This analysis does not reveal the content of people’s mental 
model, but simply extracts the words used by each speaker which are 
statistically characteristics of him. At this stage, the only assumption 
made is that there is a correlation between the mental model (how the 
farmer imagines his place in the negotiation) and his language. Then 
establish a statistical correlation between the negotiation outcome and 
the four main explanatory factors of this outcome: financial resources, 
technical resources, human resources and mental models. Our 
statistical analysis gives credit to the thesis that the fact to have a 
mental model of a certain type improves the negotiation outcome, in 
addition to the negotiation ability’s effect itself. An important feature 
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to assess this is that language is essentially structural of an individual, 
it does not change during the life.  
In section 1, we describe the agricultural policy negotiation 
problem in Costa Rica. In section 2 we develop how the concept of 
mental model was introduced in the economic literature and used to 
explain individual and collective behaviours. In section 3, we present 
a methodology to give empirical characteristics of a mental model and 
we apply this method on the negotiators in Costa Rica.  In section 4 
we present a model of the impact of mental model on the negotiation, 
in section 5 we present the estimation method of this model and in 
section 6 we present and discuss our results. 
 
1. The farm policy negotiation problem in Costa Rica  
Before liberalization of agriculture in 1994, both bean and dairy 
sectors were protected from international markets by a mixed system 
of quotas and high import tariffs, and after 1994, the dairy sector 
remained protected by high import tariffs while the bean sector had to 
face a sharp reduction of import tariffs. These differences in policy 
protection had direct consequences on the evolution of production 
(Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Evolution of bean and milk production in Costa Rica 
(FAOSTAT data) 
 
The role of cooperatives in the dairy sector has been crucial 
since the 1950s in Costa Rica. Milk production is ensured by a limited 
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number of medium-size producers, while transformation and 
marketing operations are done by cooperatives that represent a 
market share of 95%. These cooperatives, that emerged in the 1950s, 
are nowadays quasi-integrated organizations in the sense of 
Williamson (1996), or Ménard (2007). With more than 80% of the 
market share, the Dos Pinos cooperative controls most of domestic 
market and is developing its activities towards export markets. The 
dairy sector has been strongly regulated through pricing until 1999 
and import-restrictions (importing quotas until 1994, tariffs since 
1995). Farmers’ organisations have always participated to these 
policies since 1962, through the activities of advocacy organizations.  
In the bean sector, farm organizations emerged in the late 
1990s and have not played an active role in policy making processes 
until recently. Before 1994, the government supported bean 
production for the sake of consumers, bean being one of the main 
staple food in Costa Rica, through price subsidies and public agencies 
ensuring transformation and distribution operations. A large number 
of small scale farmers benefited from this protectionist policy without 
having to ask for it since policies were defined by the government 
without direct participation of bean farmers.  
As a consequence of their age and economic power, 
organizations are globally characterized by a higher resources’ 
endowment in the dairy sector than in the bean sector, in term of 
financial capacities, technical abilities and policy network insertion. 
Since Costa Rica adhesion to World Trade Organization in 1994, 
farmers’ main protection action levers are basically import tariffs 
(import quotas and state market regulation were abandoned). 
Therefore, although the process and the issues of the negotiation are 
more complex than this, we focus only on the import tariff, which is 
the main policy measure with economic consequences in the bean and 
the dairy sector in Costa Rica. It is common to interpret tariff as a 
result of political economy (Anderson & Hayami 1986; Rodrik 1996). 
As shown in table 2, the negotiated import tariffs for milk and bean 
are very different. Very high import tariffs in the dairy sector ensures 
high domestic prices, prevent competing imports, and is a clear 
economic support (economic transfer from the consumer to the 
producer). As can be seen in table 1, farmers organizations in the bean 
sector failed to get tariff protection in 1995 (full market opening 
meaning loss of domestic market protection), but managed later, in 
2003, to negotiate a higher import tariff (domestic market protection 
during domestic production period).  
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Table 1: Evolution of negotiated tariffs of milk and bean 
 Milk Bean 
 1995 2005 1995 2005 
Domestic price 
(USD/ton) 
255 269 594 570 
International price 
(USD/ton) 
225 247 430 465 
Price differential 12% 8% 28% 18% 
Negotiated tariff 117
% 
93% 1% Between 0 and 
38% 
Domestic market 
protection 
Total Total None Modular 
 
2. Some insights from the literature on mental models  
The integration of psychological dimensions in the economic 
analysis has been introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
before being emphasized recently. An important unsolved question is 
whether psychological dimension has a proper effect on action that is 
different from the effects of what has produced this psychological 
dimension, like experience, knowledge, social connexions.  
The concept of mental model is connected with a series of other 
concepts such as “beliefs” (Greif 1994; Weymouth & Broz 2006), 
“psychology factors” (Henrekson & Dreber, 2005),  “values” (Scarritt, 
2006), “ideas” (Zweynert, 2005), “culture” (Williams, 2005; Greif, 2006). 
This section aims to illustrate what mental models can add to these 
concepts.  
The idea that “beliefs” could play a role in the economy goes 
back to Peirce (1877) and has been developed more recently by authors 
like Hayek, who sees beliefs as a spirit construct that permits agents 
to interpret their environment (Hayek 1952). In that sense it is very 
close to the concept of mental models as defined more recently by 
Denzau and North “the internal representations that individuals create 
to interpret the environment” (Denzau and North, 1994, p.2). The 
mental model tends to give a coherence to our believes. If in a 
negotiation between an elephant and a mouse, if the elephant believes 
that he is a lamb and that the mouse is a wolf, he takes the behaviour 
of a lamb in front a wolf. The lamb is a – caricatured – mental model. 
As most models, it is a “device” to give coherence to a complex thing. 
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Mental model helps giving coherence to a bundle of believes. It is 
directly related to Durkheim’s representations. The concept of 
representation also expresses the need to give coherence to a bundle 
of incoherent believes. It gives an image of oneself in an environment, 
and because all relevant information to produce this image is not 
available, this image is only an interpretation of the reality. If the two 
ideas are very similar, mental models have been developed in the new 
institutional economics context, probably in the ultimate intention to 
judge the economic efficiency of the mental models. Do mental model 
actually help people, and in what circumstances? Are there “better” 
mental model than others? This stands in line with the development 
by Aoki:  “why  there  can  be  “good”  as  well  as  “bad”  institutions  
in  terms  of  their  consequences  to  economic  development  and  
societal  evolution” (Aoki, 2001).   
Economic efficiency has always been the final point in North’s 
efforts to understand how mental models affect strategic choices and 
institutional structures (Knight and North 1997, North 2005; Denzau 
and North, 1994). North further analyzes mental models’ interaction 
with institutions: guiding actions, mental models shape institutions, 
and, at the end, the evolution of societies: “institutions are the external 
manifestation of that representation” (North, 2005, p.49). This concept 
is also similar to the concept of “model of the economy” as developed 
by Keynes. For Keynes also models guide agents’ actions especially 
under uncertainty, and agents need to extract their models out of their 
experience and their observation of the world (Keynes 1978).  
Both the Keynesian and the new institutional economics 
include a learning process for the mental model to fit the environment. 
People “learn the model of the model they use in making decisions” 
(Minsky 1996). This process gives mental models their dynamic 
feature, and makes them “unstable beliefs” (Runde 1991). Agents 
construct their own models according to their experiences and making 
reference to their cultural milieu: in such a learning process, the 
models are likely to be inadapted to the prevailing institutional 
environment, notably just after a change has occurred within this 
environment. In a situation of an external institutional change, agents 
may need time to integrate this change: their mental models may not 
adapt instantly and lead to inefficient behaviours (North 2005). 
Mantzanivos et al. (2003), develop this idea that mental structures are 
flexible and changing as knowledge evolves. The time needed for this 
learning process to happen may lead to situations of little consistence 
between agents’ expectations and the economic events (Carabelli and 
De Vecchi 2010). This discrepancy can lead to a crisis of the beliefs 
framework when the gap between expected situation and actual 
situation exceeds people’s adaptation capacity (Aoki, 2001). 
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The information imperfection is a critical aspect of mental 
models. If people are perfectly informed of their strengths and defaults 
and of their environment, they adopt an appropriate behaviour. The 
mental model helps them to act without perfect information. In that 
sense, mental models are also connected to the concepts of thinking 
habits, and to the concept of bounded rationality.  The concepts of 
“habits of thought” (Veblen, 1914, p 53.; Veblen, 1919, p. 239), of 
“thinking habits” (Commons, 1935) were developed in the old 
institutional economics. These habits are analysed as a propensity or 
disposition to think in a repeated way that may guide agents’ action. 
The habit also is seen as a potential device to help people taking 
decision in the dark, as mental model. The difference between mental 
models and habits of thoughts is that mental model does not include 
the idea of repetition, and habits do not include the idea of coherence. 
People can have hundreds of disconnected thinking habits, “one for 
each case”. Nevertheless, for some authors, mental models are 
influenced by habits of thoughts, which all together, lead to a 
representation of the environment. For Hodgson, mental models result 
from habits of thoughts, defined in the old institutionalist tradition as 
what help agents to “perceive or make sense of the data received by 
their senses” (Hodgson, 1998, p 189).  
As the concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), the 
concept of mental models assumes that agents are limited by the 
information they have (their knowledge of their institutional 
environment in particular) and by their cognitive capacities (their 
interpretation of this institutional environment and, in a reflective way, 
of their place in that environment). Because of this interpretation, 
action cannot be predicted by people’s economic interest, action 
follows a of subjective patterns, such as mental models.  
The concept of mental model primarily refers to individuals. 
However, individual mental models are embedded in a social and 
institutional context (North, 2005, p.33), and are strongly affected by 
social interactions. Thus, in a given society, individual mental models 
tend to converge to create “shared mental models” (Denzau and North, 
1994). Durkheim (1989) was probably a pioneer of the idea of collective 
representation, and the idea of shared mental models is inherited of 
this literature. A shared mental model when extended at the society 
level is also an element of the culture. When Greif explains how the 
culture of a society shapes its institution (Greif, 1994; Greif 2006), it 
is similar to how the mental model of an economic sector shapes its 
institutional environment. In a similar perspective, Hall (1989) 
analyses how a “ideas of a nation” or ideas of a government can have 
a fundamental impact on its policy, and the society’s economy.  
In our research on farm policy negotiations in Costa Rica, we 
consider that the organization is a unit in which farmers individual 
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mental models are similar (i.e. existence of a shared mental model) 
and that in each organization, the leader’s individual mental model is 
representative of the organization’s shared mental model. 
Organizations’ policy behaviours are determined by organizations’ 
leaders, which are not necessarily representative of farmers in their 
organization (most likely leaders are chosen for their specific abilities 
to resist, adapt, or take part to institutional changes) but whose 
mental model includes a shared part of farmers’ mental models.  
The need for more empirical evidence 
 The search for empirical evidence of the very role of psychology 
in economy in addition to non –psychological factors is still not fully 
successful. Many authors from the new institutional economics 
underline the need to include mental models in particular into 
empirical economics as a way to improve the empirical “proofs” of 
above intuitions. A few studies explicitly deal with mental models in 
the field of management and help to imagine a methodological 
framework (Carley 1997, Hodgkinson 1997). Thus, there is no 
evidence  that mental models determine behaviours and are not simply 
the cognitive counterpart of an economic position. There is no 
quantification of mental models contribution to explain choices, nor 
empirical description of their effect. “Mental models” is not a concept 
which most economists are comfortable with. To our understanding 
this has much to do with the methodological challenges raised by the 
issue. Since mental models are dynamics and result from people’s 
history, how could they be at the same time determinant of people’s 
action, how could they be more than a simple manifestation of people’s 
changing resources, knowledge, and capacities? How could mental 
model be useful to understand action if we understand what has 
shaped these mental models? Mental models add coherence to 
independent pieces of experience, how does action need this coherence?  
 The relations between mental models and institutions still 
constitutes a research area that has to be explored in an empirical 
way, in order to better understand the mechanisms under action (Al-
ston 1996; North 1997; Shirley 2004). In this paper, we aim to bring 
such pieces of evidence and describe how mental models influence 
strategic choices made by collective actors, drawing on the example of 
farm organizations in Costa Rica, and building upon an innovative 
methodological posture. Our objective is to test the hypothesis that 
mental models influence strategic behaviours which is something dif-
ferent than describing a set of events in the light of the mental models 
agents may have.  
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3. Empirical characterization of mental models 
The principle underlying our method of mental model charac-
terisation is that the words used by two different persons placed in a 
same situation may reveal differences in their mental model.  We build 
upon a statistical analysis of textual data, i.e. discourses of farm or-
ganisations leaders for bean and dairy organizations. The data used 
in this paper were collected during extensive interviews carried out in 
2006 with eleven organizations’ leaders. 
Qualifying mental models through textual analysis 
The analysis is made with ALCESTE 1  lexicometric software 
(Viaud, 2002). This software builds multivariate analyzes to discover 
similarities and distinctions between several texts and relate these 
properties to psychological elements of their authors. It has been 
developed in the 1980s, and relies on the hypothesis that the words 
used by actors reveal their subjacent mental representations of the 
world (Reinert, 1986, p.472). The statistical analysis of textual data 
provides:  
- a quantitative definition of the lexical specificity of each text, 
based on the statistical identification of words that appear to 
be representative of this text (occurrence calculations, the 
quantitative test for a word to be representative of a class being 
a Chi-square statistics2) 
- a limited number of lexical classes based on inter-text 
representative words 
- a structural information on classes (words co-occurrence 
calculations).  
Since the texts are based on interviews about the negotiation, the 
words and words associations that appear specific of a class, reveal 
the way this person perceives the negotiation and his position in the 
negotiation. These words that are specific of a class are used to 
interpret this class in terms of a mental model. Once classes are 
identified and labelled in terms of mental models, we simply have to 
find out which organizations contribute to defining which classes, and 
we can then associate identified mental models with organisations. 
The statistics used for this stage is another Chi-square statistics, 
giving the absolute contribution of a whole text to a class. The relative 
contribution of this text to a class (as compared to its contribution to 
all classes) is the parameter we seek: the probability that a text 
contributes to a particular class, or, in other words, the probability 
that the author of this text has the mental model characteristics of 
this class.  
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This calculation is led as follows . A discourse from organisation i is 
fragmented into j strings of words. The contribution of each string to 
each lexical class k is given by a Chi-square, 
kji ,,
²
. If this value is 
zero, this string does not contribute to class k and if this value is 
strictly positive, the relative contribution of string j to class k is all the 
greater as 
kji ,,
²
 is great. As a discourse is made of many strings 
that belong to different classes, a discourse is characterised by several 
(JK) Chi-squares of the above kind. The contribution of a text i to a 
class k is 



J
j
kjikiC
1
,,, ²
. The global contribution of a text i to all 
classes is simply the sum of above contributions: 

 

K
k
J
j
kjiiGC
1 1
,,²
. 
And the relative contribution of a text i to a class k is the ratio between 
the two expressions:  
i
ki
ki
GC
C ,
, 
     (3) 
This relative contribution of a text to a class reflects the probability 
that discourse i belongs to class k.  
It is possible that several classes reflect similar mental models, 
because the words that are characteristic of each classes cannot be 
interpreted differently. In such a case – which occurs in our sample, 
our proxy of mental model will be redefined as the probability that a 
text belongs to one or the other of the two classes. This probability is 
given as follow for classes 1 and 2:  
GCi
ii
iii
CC 2,1,
2,1,12,

 
    (4) 
12,i close to 1 indicates that the leader’s discourse belongs almost 
entirely to class 1 and class 2, and 12,i

close to zero indicates a weak 
contribution of the leader’s discourse to class 1 and class 2. 
Leaders’ representativeness  
We met eleven organization’s leaders: three from the milk 
sector, four from the bean sector, and four from other farm sectors, to 
increase the lexical diversity and the robustness or our results. 
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Interviews were carried out in an open way to avoid inducing 
vocabulary similarities. Leaders were asked the following question: 
“What do you think about the policy making processes ongoing in your 
sector?”.  
Among the seven leaders interviewed representing bean and 
dairy sectors, three were paid full-time for their advocacy activities and 
were based in San José, the country‘s capital. One leader, with a 
background in international trade, was representing and defending 
the interests of the dairy sector (producers and processors). This 
leader descended from a family of dairy farmers, even though he 
himself had never worked in milk production.  Two leaders were 
representing the interests not only of the bean sector but of a whole 
range of small scale farmers. One leader had started in small scale 
food crop production and had been selected by farmers and local 
based farmers’ organizations to lead a protest peasant movement at 
the national level. The other leader had a background in sociology and 
joined an alternative movement.  
The remaining four leaders were representing organizations 
whose main activities are the processing and marketing of production. 
In the dairy sector, two leaders were paid by the organization they were 
representing. One of them was directly involved in milk production 
and served as manager of a small scale cooperative. The other one held 
the position of chief operation officer in a large scale dairy cooperative 
and was not issued from a dairy farmers family. In the bean sector, 
the two leaders interviewed were representing organizations without 
being paid for that: both drew their salary from farming.  
This brief presentation aims to show that leaders are generally 
representative of the population whose interests they defend. Two of 
three leaders representing dairy organizations were issued from dairy 
farmers’ families, and three of four leaders representing bean 
organizations came from small scale farmers’ families involved in 
staple food production.  
Statistical results: two differentiated types of mental models  
Leaders’ discourses have been fully translated from Spanish to 
French, transcribed and analyzed with ALCESTE software. The 
analysis is made on a total corpus of 10 367 words, corresponding to 
a total number of 298 elementary context units (“ecu”), 64% of them 
being classified. The analysis provided four classes, presented in Table 
2, those classes presenting a high internal homogeneity and a low 
external homogeneity. Classes are defined by representative words, 
those words having different weights in the constitution of the classes 
and being related to each other (see the ascending classification in the 
Annex). The figures into brackets correspond to the associated Chi-
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square: the higher the Chi-square, the higher the importance of the 
representative word in the constitution of the class.  
Table 2: Results of lexicometric analysis 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 4 Class 3 
Representat
ive words 
Difficult- 
(14) 
Differen- (8) 
Tariff (8) 
Support 
(13) 
Search (9) 
Cooperative 
(26) 
Sector (10) 
Development 
(6) 
Represent (6) 
Relation (5) 
Discuss (36), Trade 
(31) 
Negotiat (25), Foreign 
(25), Take (24), 
Minist- (18), Econom- 
(17), Agricult- (17), Go 
(17), Decision (10) 
Sectors Bean (20) Bean (8) Milk (58)  
% of 
classified 
ecu 
35,4% 24,1% 25,2% 15,2% 
 
Four lexical classes were identified by the analysis. The dairy 
sector is highly represented by class 4 (58 chi-square), while bean 
sector is represented by class 1 (20 chi-square) and to a lower extend 
by class 2 (8 chi-square). This indicates that leaders’ discourses are 
pretty homogenous in the dairy sector and are more heterogeneous in 
the bean sector. None of the sector variables is located in class 3: this 
class could be interpreted as a common field of perception of the policy 
negotiation process, meaning that generally speaking, leaders from 
both bean and dairy sectors are aware of the actions they have to carry 
out and of the right policy spaces they have to lobby at. The 
interpretation of the content of the three other lexicometric classes in 
terms of mental models is not straightforward. Although this 
interpretation is not necessary for the rest of our analysis, we can 
suggest a tentative interpretation. 
 Some representative words of classes 1 and 2 (“difficult”, 
“support”could reveal a defensive or negative perception towards 
policy negotiation processes. In this class, some specific wods are 
compatible with a perception of the negotiation, where actors cannot 
influence it so much. . On the contrary, the representative words of 
class 4 (“represent”, “relation”) are compatible with a proactive 
perception of policy negotiation processes, where the negotiation is  
seen as a a real opportunity to represent ones interests and to gain 
policy support. This can be related to higher expectations. 
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There seems to be a consistency between the way organizations 
actually participate to policy making (behaviour) and the way leaders 
perceive this process (mental model). In the dairy sector, leaders speak 
as if they were aware that their implication in the negotiation can have 
a real impact on the negotiation outcome: policy making is perceived 
as a real opportunity and the behaviour can be qualified as proactive 
(“policy maker”). They have experienced that the policy making process 
is a negotiation in which they have a bargaining power which involves 
resources, and not an exogenous political phenomenon. In the bean 
sector, the identified mental model tend to support the thesis that 
policy making is perceived as an exogenous mechanism which they 
cannot really influence, and the behaviour can be qualified as 
defensive (“policy taker”). 
The dynamics of institutional change can be faster than the 
dynamic of mental models. The mental model prevailing in the dairy 
sector seems consistent with the liberalization ongoing policy reforms. 
The mental model prevailing in the bean sector can appear as 
inconsistent within the liberalization context, but could be consistent 
with the pre-liberalization context. But if we look at the context before 
liberalization, it gives quite a different picture. Indeed, in the bean 
sector, the institutional environment was basically made of public 
support to farmers under the form of production subsidies: farmers 
were in position of “receiving” a stable public support without having 
to negotiate it. Their policy taker attitude was adapted to that specific 
context, which could explain a policy taker attitude in the first stages 
of the liberalization. In the milk sector, there were important public 
regulations too but professional organizations used to negotiate the 
regulations content, and were encouraged to do so. This past of strong 
and frequent interactions between milk sector and the government 
explains that mental model tends to indicate an active participation in 
policy making processes and efficient policy results.  
 
b. The model  
In this section, we present the general model used to attribute 
what part of the difference in negotiation outcomes is due to objective 
factors such as technical, human and financial resources, and what 
part is eventually due to mental models. 
The purpose of our model is to better present and discuss to 
what extent the negotiator’s mental model can be considered as an 
additional factor of the negotiation outcome, and not only as another 
interpretation of existing explanations. In other words, the model is 
meant to accept or reject the idea that if a negotiator from the bean 
sector had a mental model from the negotiator in the bean sector, but 
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with his own negotiation skills, financial, human and technical re-
sources, he would have achieved a different outcome. The model is 
meant to raise the question whether we are allowed to think ceteris 
paribus about mental model. Is it correct to imagine people with their 
skills but a different mental model, which would play a distinct role 
on their economic achievement? To be concrete, if the bean negotiators 
were born more demanding, or if the history of their social milieu, of 
their organisation had made them more ambitious, or more demand-
ing, without improving their other capacities, they may have achieved 
higher political support. Conversely, if the negotiators in the milk sec-
tor were born less demanding, or had not learnt to demand a lot during 
their political life, they may have achieved a lower political support. 
The idea that mental model is an additional factor of outcome 
more than a combination of existing factors can be represented as fol-
lows. If Mental model was a purely exogenous variable, for instance if 
people were born with a definite mental model, there would be no econ-
ometric problem in the assessment of their role in the outcome. But it 
is not the case. Mental models are partly determined by innate char-
acter of the individual (which we do not measure) and by the individ-
ual’s evolution in a social milieu, including in his farm organisation. 
Because of this, mental models could be correlated with the outcome 
without being a cause of the outcome, but simply a result from the 
negotiation skills and resources, that would be the true cause of the 
outcome. We cannot technically demonstrate that this is not the case. 
But we can restrict our measure of the mental model to limit this pos-
sibility. We need to focus on the innate side of the psychological di-
mension of mental model more than on its intellectual dimension. The 
mental model we deal with relates to the propensity of someone to ex-
pect a lot or not from an uncertain process. In that sense, it is close to 
someone’s ambition, which is different from his ability to achieve his 
goal. 
We suggest the following framework, represented in Figure2 
below.  
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Figure 2. Model to be estimated 
 
 
The negotiation outcome results from four factors that are not directly 
measurable or are multidimensional: mental model, technical ability, 
financial capacity and human resources. The outcome is the public 
support for the the farm sector that results from the negotiation. 
Mental model is supposed to be correlated to the fact that the leader 
sees the negotiation as a losing game (and his objective is to lose as 
little as possible) or a winning gam (and his objective is to win as much 
as possible). Technical ability depends on three measurable 
dimensions: the fact the leaders have a management degree or not, the 
fact that the organization has elaborated its own proposal for the 
negotiation, the fact that the organization has an expertise. The 
human resources also result in three factors: the insertion in policy 
network, its ties with politics, and the fact that some of her mebers 
belong to government. Financial resources depend on resources 
specifically dedicated to lobbying activity and financial resources in 
general.  
These four factors themselves result from the organisation’s history 
and their negotiator’s Individual preferences, skills and other 
characteristics. The role of these individual characteristics on these 
four factors is not made explicit in our empirical estimation of the 
model. Only the role of the organization history is. This history has 
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three dimensions: its age, its previous participations to negotiations, 
its previous interactions with policy makers.  
5 Empirical estimation 
Several methodological difficulties arise in the empirical estimation 
of such a model. Firstly, we have too few observations - eleven organ-
isations - to make a least square estimation. We do not interview farm-
ers, but their leaders who actually take part to the negotiation.  Sec-
ondly, our four explanatory factors of the outcome are not purely ex-
ogenous variables, but combinations of variables that also potentially 
endogenous. For instance, the fact that an organisation is inserted in 
a network before the negotiation may well be a consequence of the 
negotiation to come and the expected outcome. It would then be a mis-
take to consider it as an explanation of a good outcome. For this rea-
son as well a least square estimation is not consistent.   The appropri-
ate method for the kind of model we aim at estimating is typically a 
partial least square (PLS) modelling approach (Lohmöller, 1989; Wold, 
1982, Tenenhaus, 1995). Our PLS model has two steps:  
- We estimate the six latent (unobserved) variables out of the 
manifest (observed) variables. We measure the structural 
relationships between those six latent variables as drawn in 
figure 1. Signs and significance of the relationships between 
latent variables confirm or not the theoretical relationships 
that we have assumed.  If we find that the mental model has 
no influence on the outcome, or that the mental model 
associated with the bean sector yields a better outcome ceteris 
paribus, that means that mental models play no role or a un 
unexpected role in the negotiation.  
- In a first step, each latent variable is estimated as a linear 
combination of its observable variables (Tenenhaus et al., 2005, 
p167). In a second step, the causal model is estimated trough 
a partial least square estimation of the following structural 
equations  
iii
iii
FINANCEHUMAN
TECHNICSMODELMENTALOUTCOME



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320
 
iii HISTORYMODELMENTAL 110 ._    
iii HISTORYTECHNICS 210 .    
iii HISTORYHUMAN 310 .    
iii HISTORYFINANCE 410 .    
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Organisation’s history is summarized by the latent variable 
HISTORY, a linear combination of three manifest variables: AGE is the 
organisation age, EXPERIENCE is a dummy variable (1 if the 
organisation had participated at least to one policy negotiation before 
this one, zero if not), INTERACTION is a dummy variable (1 if the 
organisation had had interaction with policy makers before, zero if not).  
Mental model is a latent variable that is a function of one 
observable variable only, which is our measurement of mental model. 
This measure is presented below in a specific section. When 
MENTAL_MODEL is close to 1, it means that the leader has very low 
expectations regarding the policy negotiation, while when 
MENTAL_MODEL is closed to 0, it means that the leader has high 
expectations and is mentally prepared to a winning game. A lexical 
analysis of leaders’ discourses establishes several mental types, and 
MENTAL_MODEL is the probability to belong to the type 
corresponding to low expectations. The practical measurement of this 
probability is detailed in section 3.  
Technical ability is a latent variable (TECHNICS) depending on 
three observable variables: the percentage of leaders in the 
organisation’s management team with a university degree 
(EDUCATION), a dummy variable for the case whether the 
organisation has made up its own proposal for the negotiation 
(PROPOSAL), and a dummy variable whether the organisation has 
been solicitude for her expertise (EXPERTISE).  
Human resource is a latent variable (HUMAN) depending on 
three observable variables: The insertion in formal policy network 
(NETWORK), the existence of personal ties with policy makers (TIES), 
the fact that the organisatuion is member of the government or not 
(GOVERNMENT).  
FINANCE is a latent variable for financial resources, depending 
on two manifest variables: how much mioney is spent specifically on 
policy making activity (SPECIFIC) and wherther or not the total 
amount of financial resource in the organisation is greater than the 
national average (GLOBAL).  
OUTCOME is the latent value for negotiation outcome, 
resulting from one observable variable: the degree of economic 
protection, evaluated in terms of the main policy measure under 
discussion, ie the tariff level. A higher level of policy measure δ is 
synonymous of better result for the organization. At the end of the 
negotiation, the negotiated policy measure δ* is a weighted average of 
the ideal policy level δi achievable by organization and the policy level 
proposed by the other party (government under pressure of other WTO 
third countries)  .  
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(1) 
A value of    close to 1 at the end of negotiation reflects that the 
degree of political support is high, meaning a positive outcome.  A 
value close to zero reveals a low protection, or a low negotiation 
outcome.  We find   to be a good indicator of the outcome, so that we 
set 
i
i
OUTCOME





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6. Results: Mental models role in behaviours 
 
Empirical estimation of the model 
The table 4 presents the estimation of the 6 latent variables 
from the 13 manifest variables. The stability of the result is tested fol-
lowing test by Chin (1998) and Hulland, (1999), and the six latent var-
iables are stable. Individual item reliability is considered as adequate 
when its factor loading is greater than 0,7; the fit between a latent 
variable and its manifest variables is good when the latent variable 
composite reliability is greater than 0,8 and its average variance ex-
tracted is greater than 0,5. As in an ordinary least square regression, 
a t-stat greater than 1,96 indicates that the relationship between a 
manifest variable and the latent is significant at the 5% level. Table 3 
synthesizes results on the estimation of the six latent variables.  
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Table 3: Estimation of the six latent variables of our model 
Latent varia-
ble 
Com-
posite 
relia-
bility 
Average 
vari-
ance 
ex-
tracted 
Manifest 
variables 
Weight 
Load-
ing 
Stand-
ard er-
ror 
t-stat 
  
HISTORY 
 
 
0,90 0,75 Age 
Experi-
ence 
Interac-
tions 
- 
0,28 
0,39 
- 
0,83 
0,91 
- 
0,04 
0,13 
- 
18,38 
6,73 
  
MEN-
TAL_MODEL 
1 1 
2,1  
Probabil-
ity to be-
long 
to class 1 
or 2 
1 1 - -   
TECNICS 0,88 0,71 Educa-
tion 
Proposal 
Expertise 
0,41 
0,45 
0,33 
0,87 
0,92 
0,71 
0,18 
0,23 
0,28 
4,88 
4,04 
2,52 
  
HUMAN 0,78 0,50 Network 
Govern-
ment 
Ties 
0,62 
0,56 
- 
0,83 
0,79 
- 
0,21 
0,07 
- 
3,89 
10,24 
- 
  
FINANCE 0,95 0,90 Specific 
Global 
0,57 
0,48 
0,96 
0,94 
0,06 
0,13 
15,11 
7,35 
  
          
          
          
OUTCOME 1 1   
protec-
tion level 
1 1 - -   
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Table 4 presents the relationships between the six constructed latent 
variables of our structural model.   
Table 4: Estimation of the structural model 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
Coeffi-
cient 
Standard 
deviation 
Upper 
limit 
(95%) 
Lower 
limit 
(95%) 
MEN-
TAL_MODEL 
HISTORY -0,932 0,048 -1,026 -0,838 
TECHNICS HISTORY 0,923 0,070 0,787 1,060 
HUMAN HISTORY 0,902 0,094 0,717 1,086 
FINANCE HISTORY 0,865 0,058 0,750 0,979 
OUTCOME MEN-
TAL_MODEL 
-0,260 0,024 -0,308 -0,212 
TECHNICS 0,264 0,019 0,226 0,302 
HUMAN 0,258 0,019 0,220 0,296 
FINANCE 0,239 0,012 0,216 0,262 
 
The four first rows in table 4 simply indicate how experience in 
negotiation influences the different factors explaining negotiation 
outcome. Their role in our analysis is only to show that neither mental 
models nor the organisation skills and resources are purely exogenous. 
They evolve with time and with experience. The results confirm that 
having a significant experience in policy negotiation processes 
decreases the probability to coin a mental model from class 1 and 2 
(the “defensive” type), β=-0,932. This experience, tends to increase 
technical abilities, human resources, and financial resources, as 
defined by our manifest variables.  
The four last rows indicate how these latent variables explain 
the outcome. As expected, technical, human and financial resources 
influence positively the negotiation outcome, which has already been 
confirmed by a vast literature (Penrose 1959, Mac Carthy and Zald 
1977, Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1997). We also show that mental 
models have a significant weight on the policy outcomes obtained (β=-
0,260), which means the mental model of a defensive type decreases 
the chance to get a better outcome from the negotiation. Although once 
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could consider this as an obvious statement, the impact of mental 
model on an economic outcome had not been measured yet. 
Furthermore, the relative weight of mental models in the 
determination of policy outcomes is quite equivalent to the relative 
weight of technical abilities and human resources and slightly higher 
in absolute value to the weight of financial capacities in the 
constitution of the outcomes. The way policy negotiations are 
perceived by organizations’ leaders is directly influencing the policy 
outcomes obtained.  
Discussion 
Our results suggest that negotiators in the sector have too low 
expectations toward the ongoing negotiation about mitigating policies 
during the liberalisation process. Their mental model does not seem 
adapted to the negotiation. This does not reveal a lack of interest to 
take part to the change, but more likely a lack of auto-legitimation to 
take part to the change.  
The pre-liberalisation environment had favoured a  “policy-
taking” attitude in the bean sector, because most farmers in the bean 
sector have little investment, little profit, and little economic risk. They 
are not used to be helped, nor threatened. They cannot run bankrupt 
and cannot easily become rich.  This does not favour mentalities which 
claim any policy support from anyone, even though the aggregate 
economic stakes of liberalisation may be as great as in the milk sector.  
In order to be a good negotiator, you have to claim, and you have to be 
convinced that you have a right to get economic support. In the dairy 
sector, the institutional environment prevailing before the 
liberalization included incentives for farmers to take part actively to 
policy processes, but also to claim lower interest rates with banks, 
higher prices to buyers, etc. It is not clear whether farmer in the milk 
sector deserve a political support more than farmers in the bean sector, 
but they believe they do, and this make the difference.  
Alternative interpretation could also be put forward to explain 
the lower outcome in the bean sector. In particular, the economic loss 
per farmer would probably be greater in the milk sector if liberalisation 
was complete and uncompensated, because of the economic 
investment in the milk sector. 
Conclusion  
The starting point of this paper is the observation that, in the 
process of economic liberalization, some farm sectors in Costa Rica  
manage to negotiate a high import tariff whereas others do not, which 
has a tremendous consequences on farmers’ life in the respective farm 
sector. . We make the hypothesis that some of the reason of these 
differences in attitude is a differences in their mental models, the 
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defensive type being convinced that it is not legitimate for him to ask 
for policy support, the offensive type being convinced that it is 
legitimate for him to ask for support. We characterized the negotiators’ 
mental models through a statistical analysis of their discourses and 
we measure the relative weight of mental models in the determination 
of policy outcomes obtained by organizations through a partial least 
square analysis. The main result is that mental models as we 
characterize them influence negotiations outcomes in the same 
proportion as financial resources, human resources or technical skills. 
The scope of what organizations’ leaders consider to be legitimate 
expectations seems to have a significant impact on policy negotiation 
outcomes.  
Mental models are shaped by specific institutional 
environments and adapt slowly to changes in those environments. 
When an exogenous change occurs, mental models tend to persist and 
may lead to inappropriate behaviours. We find that those 
organizations that have been used to negotiate have learnt to defend 
higher expectations, involve more resources in the negotiation, and 
tend to get more and quicker policy support in response to an 
economical change 
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